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SUBSTITUTION OR SYMBOLIC EFFECTS?  
A REEXAMINATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
1
 
 
 
In this paper, we use a sample of large Canadian corporations to test the 
substitution hypothesis and the symbolic hypothesis. We find that the positive 
effect of board independence on firm performance declines as managerial 
ownership increases. This effect becomes non-positive when highly concentrated 
managerial ownership makes independent board more symbolic than effective.  
 
Introduction 
 
The corporate governance of organizations has received substantial attention going back to Berle 
and Means (1932). Agency theory, which suggests that good governance should protect shareholders' 
interest through either aligning their interests with that of managers, or controlling managerial discretion 
through monitoring, has long been the dominant perspective in studies of corporate governance (see 
Daily, Dalton and Cannella, 2003; Eisenhardt, 1989; Schleifer and Vishny, 1997, for reviews). Based on 
agency theory, one stream of research has focused primarily on the relationship between governance 
mechanisms, strategic decision-making and firm performance. Such research usually assumes implicitly 
that corporate mechanisms are either given, or work independently (e.g., Coles, McWilliams and Sen, 
2001; Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999; Rediker and Seth, 1995). The better a particular governance 
mechanism is at constraining managerial discretion, the better the firm performance and shareholder 
value. However, contrary to the predictions of agency theory, several recent comprehensive reviews find 
no support for a relationship between equity ownership and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Certo and 
Roengpitya, 2003; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997), CEO pay and firm performance (Tosi, Werner, Katz and 
Gomez-Mejia, 2000), and board composition and firm performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and 
Johnson, 1998). These disappointing findings suggest that “alternative theories and models are needed to 
effectively uncover the promise and potential of corporate governance.” (Daily et al., 2003: 375). 
 
 
Pointing out the limitation of the assumption that governance mechanisms are independent of 
each other, Dalton et al. (2003: 22) called for the development of substitution theory, which suggests that 
governance mechanisms “effectively substitute for one another and/or operate in concert.” Alternative 
mechanisms may substitute for each other and the effect of a particular mechanism should be influenced 
by the levels of other mechanisms which simultaneously operate in the firm (e.g. Boyd, 1994; Rediker 
and Seth, 1995). However, very few studies have examined the substitution effect on corporate strategy 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgement: We thank Terry Amburgey, Stewart Melanson and Nan Jia for valuable comments 
on earlier versions of the paper.   
 126 
and performance (see Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg, et al., 1999, for exceptions). At the 
same time, behaviorally oriented studies introduce a symbolic management perspective on corporate 
governance (Westphal and Zajac 1994, 1995). This perspective suggests that top managers can satisfy 
demands for better corporate governance while avoiding loss of autonomy by adopting but not 
implementing governance structures that address shareholder interests. This argument proposes another 
explanation of the ineffectiveness of the “good corporate governance” suggested by the agency theory. It 
is very likely that both mechanisms work simultaneously in a firm but no existing study has inquired into 
this direction.  
 
 
In this paper, we test both the substitution hypothesis and the symbolic hypothesis and try to 
explain why there is little consensus in research on the performance effect of several governance 
mechanisms (Dalton et al., 2003). In particular, we investigate how the interaction between board 
independence and concentrated managerial ownership influences firm performance. Based on substitution 
hypothesis, we argue that the positive effect of board independence will decrease as managerial 
ownership concentration increases. However, according to the symbolic hypothesis, we predict that when 
management gets entrenched through highly concentrated ownership, board independence is used for 
symbolic purposes and will have no effect or even a negative effect on firm performance. We use a panel 
data sample of 88 large Canadian corporations during the period 1997-2001 to test the hypotheses. 
Besides taking advantage of the panel data structure, we also employ a two stage least square (2SLS) 
model with instrumental variables to account for the potential endogeneity problem.  
 
 
 
Theory and Hypotheses 
 
 
Large public corporations are usually characterized as having a highly diffuse ownership structure 
that effectively separates the ownership of residual claims on the firm from control over decision-making. 
Owners delegate internal control in public companies to a board of directors, and the board then delegates 
most decision-making and control functions to internal agents (managers). Under this structure, managers, 
with their firm-specific knowledge and managerial expertise, are believed to gain an advantage over firm 
owners who are largely removed from the firm’s operations (Mizruchi, 1988). Therefore, the central 
theme of agency theory is that of managers pursuing self-interested actions that are in conflict with the 
interests of owners (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Specific governance 
mechanisms are therefore designed to protect shareholders’ interests by reducing the agency costs due to 
conflicts of interest. Two basic types of governance mechanisms deal with the agency problem: 
“alignment” and “monitoring” (Dalton et al., 2003). Managerial ownership is used to for “alignment”, 
while board of directors is used to monitor the management. However, there are two opposing arguments 
about managerial equity ownership (see Denis and McConnell, 2003, for a review). The alignment 
hypothesis suggests that managerial equity ownership can align managers’ interests with those of 
shareholders. Higher equity ownership of managers can lead to better performance. The entrenchment 
hypothesis, however, suggests that a higher level of managerial ownership gives managers a greater 
degree of control over the firm, and when their control is less likely to be challenged, they are more likely 
to engage in managerial discretion that may hurt shareholder value. Combining the two suggests a 
curvilinear relationship between managerial ownership and firm performance, a relationship that has been 
established in many empirical studies (e.g. Gedajlovic and Shapiro, 1998).  
The board of directors represents another kind of internal constraint. Because shareholders are 
typically removed from the day-to-day management of the firm, they delegate the monitoring function to 
the board of directors (Boyd, 1990; Eisenhardt, 1989). In order to fulfill this fiduciary responsibility, the 
board has the power to hire, fire, and compensate top management and to ratify important decisions. 
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Longstanding calls for board reform have emphasized an increase in the board’s ability to exercise control 
by increasing board independence. Such reforms include increasing the proportion of outside or non-
employee directors on the board, separating the board leadership from the CEO, and increasing 
demographic diversity on the board. Although both inside and outside directors are responsible for 
overseeing corporate strategy and managerial discretion, outsiders are believed to evaluate and monitor 
the management more objectively, and are more willing to challenge the CEO’s position on strategic 
issues (Fama and Jensen, 1983). On the other hand, inside directors are more likely to acquiesce to more 
senior manager/directors and less likely to monitor the management independently (Zahra and Pearce, 
1989). CEOs who also hold the Chair position have more power over both managerial decision-making as 
well as board affairs, compared to the case in which the CEO and Chair position are held separately. The 
concentration of power in the CEO promotes CEO entrenchment and reduces the ability of the board to 
perform its fiduciary duty and to constrain managerial discretion (Finkelstein and D’Aveni, 1994). 
Although structurally independent boards are expected to control management more effectively (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983), there seems to be little empirical consensus regarding whether board independence 
necessarily improves corporate performance (Bhagat and Black, 2002; Walsh and Seward, 1990; 
Wesphal, 1998). In the following discussion, we try to combine the substitution hypothesis with the 
symbolic hypothesis to explain the inconclusiveness in empirical studies. 
  
The Substitution Hypothesis 
 
Although corporate governance studies usually implicitly assume that individual corporate 
governance mechanisms are independent of one another, the substitution hypothesis suggests that the 
effect of individual governance mechanisms is contingent on the effect of other mechanisms, and 
organizations can select a configuration of governance mechanisms based on their idiosyncratic firm 
characteristics in order to maximize firm value (Rediker and Seth, 1995: 86; Dalton, et al., 2003). There 
are two central premises of the substitution hypothesis. The first is that corporate governance design is a 
firm’s response to its environment (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). For example, firms in highly technical 
industries may find it useful to have a board that has a high degree of specialized skills and knowledge 
that can only be supplied by inside directors. Because it is difficult for directors and owners to monitor 
management, the firm may choose to design a compensation package that is more performance sensitive 
(Coles, McWilliams and Sen, 2001). Based on a substitution perspective, Beatty and Zajac (1994) find 
that the greater the environmental risk, the lower the proportion of incentive compensation for the chief 
executives because managers are risk averse and reluctant to accept such compensation contracts. To 
solve this problem, firms must adopt an effective board structure to provide active monitoring. Booth, 
Cornett and Tehranian (2002) find that regulations reduce the managerial discretion and the need for the 
effective monitoring of managers becomes less important.  
 
 
The second central premise of this argument is that firms choose a given governance mechanism 
to compensate for the dysfunction of other mechanisms. If agency problems cannot be solved by some 
mechanism, firms would emphasize other mechanisms to alleviate agency costs. For example, Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) argue that if the market for corporate control and managerial labor markets perfectly 
aligned the interests of managers and shareholders, then there should be little or no potential for control 
through more effective monitoring by owners. When these external constraints fail, owners may be able 
to influence managers internally. Many empirical studies found results consistent with the substitution 
effect. Using a sample of Canadian firms for the period 1993-1997, Park, Nelson and Torabzadeh (2000) 
find empirical support for a substitution effect between ownership structure and executive compensation. 
They found that a closely held firm, either controlled by an individual or an entity which controls a large 
block of voting rights, places less weight on market-based incentives in executive pay compared to 
widely-held firms, because controlling owners have an incentive to substitute direct monitoring for more 
expensive market-based incentive compensation. On the other hand, Beatty and Zajac (1994) show that 
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when managerial incentives, in the form of contingent contracts, are only weakly tied to firm 
performance, strong board monitoring could substitute for a managerial alignment mechanism. They 
found that a lower proportion of contingent compensation for top managers was associated with higher 
blockholder ownership, and greater board independence (also see Zajac and Westphal, 1994). Mishra and 
Nielsen (2000) find similar results in the banking industry. Li (1994) found that higher levels of bank 
ownership reduces the proportion of outside directors in the board, but high levels of state ownership 
increases this proportion. This is because large bank owners have incentive and ability to monitor 
management which therefore reduces the necessity to recruit outside directors for vigilant monitoring. 
While in the case of state ownership, outsiders provide a monitoring function because a large state 
shareholder is not equal to the intense monitoring. Finally, Rediker and Sethi (1995) and Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996) are more explicit about the nature of the substitution effects between several governance 
mechanisms and find that the monitoring potential of the board is reduced at high levels of monitoring by 
large outside shareholders, or high levels of mutual monitoring by other senior managers and a high level 
of ownership by the CEO.  
 
 
The substitution hypothesis suggests that the adoption of one mechanism is dependent on the use 
of other mechanisms. However, we know little about the combined effects of multiple mechanisms and 
the empirical evidence is extremely scarce.  For example, Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) found that a 
positive relationship between ownership concentration and profitability exists only if internal and/or 
external constraints do not exist, or that they operate imperfectly. Coles, McWilliams and Sen (2001) 
found that one mechanism’s impact on performance is dependent on the level of other mechanisms. Coles 
et al (2001) found that boards that are dominated by insiders, but that provide for higher CEO incentive 
alignment, have better market performance than those that lack both monitoring and CEO incentive 
alignment. In this study, we focus on the substitution effect between board independence and managerial 
ownership. In particular, we are interested in how the effect of board independence is influenced by a 
concentration level of managerial ownership. According to the substitution hypothesis, we suggest that 
the effectiveness of independent board to reduce agency cost is contingent on the effectiveness of 
managerial ownership that can align the interest of management with that of shareholders. Since both 
mechanisms are supposed to be able to maximize the firm value, we should observe the positive effect of 
board independence on firm performance even after controlling for the substitution effect of managerial 
ownership.  
 
 
Hypothesis 1: The positive effect of board independence on firm performance will decrease when 
the managerial ownership increases. The overall effect of board independence after controlling for the 
substitution effect should be positive before the level of managerial ownership gives managers ability to 
entrench themselves. 
 
The Symbolic Hypothesis 
 
The substitution hypothesis presupposes a rational choice between efficient mechanisms based on 
the level of other mechanisms, even if this mechanism produces decreasing but positive returns. However, 
it is contradictory if we find a negative effect of board independence. If one mechanism reduces firm 
performance, why would it not be modified from a rational efficiency perspective? In fact, several 
empirical studies have documented that board independence has a negative effect on firm performance. 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Bhagat and Black (2001) document a negative relationship between 
board independence and firm performance. Booth and Deli (1996) find that more outside directors hinder 
firms’ growth opportunities. A recent study in Canada also finds that board independence does not have a 
positive influence on firm value (Erickson, Park, Reising and Shin, 2005). 
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It is likely that firms are constrained in their ability to adjust governance structure to an optimal 
design. There are a couple of possible reasons for this. The first is that firms do not know what the 
optimal level of any governance mechanism is because of the ambiguity in the effect of various 
governance mechanisms on firm performance. Second, managers are powerful enough to influence how 
board operates and reduce the effect of an independent board. An example is that top managers can 
circumvent an independent board and reduces the monitoring effect of the board (Westphal, 1998). 
However, this "board game" exists no matter whether managers hold equity ownership (Westphal, 1998) 
and no empirical evidence has been established that it has a negative effect on firm performance. 
Moreover these explanations cannot tell us why firms still adopt some mechanisms which may negatively 
influence firm performance.  
 
 
The third possible explanation is that some governance mechanisms are in place not to solve the 
agency problem but rather serve as a symbolic function. The classic sociological account argues that the 
early diffusion of organization practice is due to efficiency improvement but later diffusion is for 
institutional reasons (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Westphal, Gulati and Shortell, 1997). When one 
governance mechanism is regarded as legitimate among shareholders, firms are pressured to conform to 
the pervasive norms and adopt this mechanism even if it is not necessary from an efficiency perspective. 
This is likely to happen when the legitimacy of corporate governance practices are questionable from the 
perspectives of shareholders. For example, the symbolic adoption of long term incentive plans for 
managers (LTIP) should have favorable market reaction (Westphal and Zajac, 1998). Cahen and 
Wilkinson (1999) find that the proportion of outside directors in a sample of New Zealand companies 
increased by about 5% after the 1993 Companies Act that reflects the requirement of shareholders for 
high independent board. To appease shareholders and markets, the firm is compelled to use some 
corporate governance practices to conform to institutional norms for symbolic purposes. Li (1994), for 
instance, found that firms with high state ownership typically add more outside directors to the board 
because outsiders can provide legitimacy and accountability to the public that the state-owned firms are 
seen to lack. 
 
 
But one might question how such symbolic actions would truly help the firm. For example, it has 
been found that firms with a majority of outside directors do not perform better than those firms whose 
boards fail to meet the American Law Institute’s proposed guidelines urging an increase in outside 
representation (Mishra and Nielsen, 2000).  Outside directors come at a cost. More outside directors with 
diverse knowledge and background make decision-making complex, and consensus hard to reach.  
Moreover, more outside directors reduce the dependence on insiders when making strategic decisions. 
Compared to outside directors, inside directors have access to internal information and knowledge of the 
firm’s operations and strategies (Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990). Insiders are also interested in projects 
that can produce long-term returns (Tihanyi, et al., 2003). Outside directors tend to use objective financial 
controls in monitoring managers rather than strategic controls because they lack necessary knowledge of 
the firm’s operations (Eisenhardt, 1989). When managers are monitored by a board overrepresented by 
outside directors who prefer to use objective criteria to monitor mangers, they should prefer strategies 
with short-term payoffs rather than long-term valuable, but risky, projects. This is because if managers 
were evaluated on short-term performance goals (financial criteria that are objective and easy to 
evaluate), no matter how promising their long-term investments are, their incentive for wealth 
maximization would be reduced (e.g. Lane, Cannella, and Lubatkin, 1998). This would ultimately reduce 
firm performance. On the other hand, the superiority of the amount and quality of inside directors’ 
information may help to provide a more effective evaluation of top executives especially in the case of 
long-term projects and when the environment is highly unpredictable. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
empirical studies have reported a positive relationship between inside directors and corporate R&D 
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spending (Baysingner, Kosnik and Turk, 1991; Hill and Snell, 1988). Therefore, if some mechanisms 
adopted for symbolic reasons are not consistent with the efficiency considerations, they may actually 
hinder firm performance. 
 
 
As in Li’s (1994) case, our study suggests one possible context in which firms are likely to be 
subject to institutional pressure to adopt symbolic corporate governance practices. When managerial 
ownership concentration of a firm is too high from the perspective of other shareholders, the effectiveness 
of the corporate governance of the firm is called into question. High managerial ownership may entrench 
managers who therefore have conflicting interests with shareholders (McConnell and Servaes, 1990). We 
argue that when ownership becomes very concentrated in the hands of management, it may be important 
for firms to ‘overuse’ some other mechanisms symbolically to convince other shareholders that their 
concentrated ownership is not detrimental to firm performance since they have an effective board that 
would safeguard shareholders’ interests. Firms would adopt this mechanism even if it hurts firm 
performance since it is symbolically important. At high level of managerial ownership, we should expect 
no substitution effect since managerial ownership is not used to reduce agency cost, but increases the 
institutional pressure for the firm. 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of board independence on firm performance will become non-positive 
when the managerial ownership becomes so high that managers are “entrenched”. 
 
 
Sample and Variables 
 
This study focuses on large Canadian corporations. Many Canadian CEOs are the founders and 
controlling shareholders of the firms they manage, unlike in the United States and U.K. where most 
public companies widely held (Erickson et al. 2005). The sample is based on the 1997-2001 Canadian 
Spencer Stuart Board Index (CSSBI), which is composed of one hundred of the largest public companies 
in Canada each year. All companies in the index have revenues of over $1 billion Canadian and reflect a 
comprehensive cross-section of Canadian business. This index was created to control for the size effect 
and for purposes of comparison with the U.S. Canada’s largest 100 public firms have an average of $5.7 
billion in revenue compared to the S&P 500 firms, which have an average of $15.7 billion in revenue 
(based on 2001 data). Because the index is updated every year according to the firm revenue, the 100 
firms in this index may differ by year. Firms that either merged or were acquired during this period were 
dropped from the sample. Finally we constructed a balanced panel in which each of the 88 firms has five 
year records. This yielded 440 observations. The panel structure of the data allows us to control for firm-
level fixed effects. Although the panel is balanced for the sake of statistical analysis, this procedure 
reduces the randomness of the sample and caution is required when interpreting the result. The CSSBI 
report provides information about board composition such as the board size and the number or related 
directors. Other data on board composition, as well as data on ownership was collected from proxy 
statements; these statements also served as a validity check on CSSBI data. Financial and industry data 
were collected from Compustat. 
Return on average assets (ROA) for each year is used as the measure of firm profitability. ROA is 
a common measure of firm performance, and has the advantage of being a relative measure (i.e. to the 
asset base of the firm). Although operational profitability is to a certain extent different than market value, 
it could still be regarded as an indicator of how well the firm solves the agency problem. Management 
ownership (MGTOWN) is measured as the proportion of shares owned by the CEO, other senior 
management, and their immediate families who keep ownership individually or through their controlled 
corporations. MGTOWN measures the incentive alignment effect and its squared is MGTOWN2. 
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The Globe & Mail’s Report on Business Survey of Corporate Governance, an annual survey of 
corporate governance practices of large Canadian corporations in Canada’s national newspaper, has a 
strict standard regarding what counts as “related”: this includes any directors who are immediate family 
members of senior management, those who provide professional services to the company (typically 
lawyers, accountants, bankers and consultants), former executives of the company, or those who are 
executives of a parent company. According to this strict definition, an independent director has no 
financial ties of any kind with a company except for directorship fees. Accordingly, we measure board 
independence with the percentage of outside independent directors who have no association with the firm 
(IND) and the separation of CEO and Chair positions (SEP). SEP is equal to 1 if the CEO does not hold 
the chair position and 0 otherwise. It is worthwhile to note that governance structures are collected 
originally from the proxy reports that are usually produced during the middle of the year t measuring the 
governance structure from year t-1 up to that day. Since our performance measure is the year t average, 
we assume the independent variable measures are before the performance measures.  
 
 
We control for other major shareholders including the percentage of stock outstanding held by all 
institutional investors (INST) in a firm, and the proportion of shares owned by large blockholders (BLK) 
including unaffiliated individuals, other corporations and government ownership. A major shareholder 
has both the incentive and ability to monitor management to ensure profit maximization due to their high 
residual claim on assets and their influence on board of directors (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Bethel and 
Liebeskind, 1993). We control for the firm’s capital structure because it may confound the effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance (Jensen, 1989). The need for external sources of financing can 
present a powerful constraint on managerial behavior (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). The need for 
managers to go outside the firm periodically for financing and to disclose the financial condition to 
outside investors reduces the managerial discretion to pursue self-interested strategizing. We use two 
indicators for this control. Leverage is measured by the ratio of long-term debt over total assets, and 
Liquidity is measured by the ratio of cash and equivalent over total asset. According to free cash flow 
theory (Jensen 1986), the agency cost would be high when the organization produces substantial free cash 
flows. Agency problems can also be constrained by external markets. A highly competitive market 
reduces agency costs and therefore the marginal effect of other corporate governance mechanisms (e.g. 
Hart, 1983; Nickle, Nicolitsas and Dryden, 1997). Therefore, we use use Sales growth, measured as the 
year-over-year percentage change in sales, to control for the demand condition of the market (Gedajlovic 
and Shapiro, 1998). We also include year dummies to control for the temporal effect.   
 
 
Empirical Model 
 
 
itiitititititit XMGTOWNbodindMGTOWNMGTOWNbodindROA εµγββββα +++×++++= 4321 2      (1) 
 
We employ the above empirical model to test our hypotheses. Index i represents the firm, time t is 
years, and εit is the random error term. “bodind” is board independence measured by “IND” or “SEP”. 
“bodind*MGTOWN” is the interaction between “bodind”and “MGTOWN”. Xit represents control 
variables and µi, the unobserved firm characteristics that influence a firm’s performance. A common 
critique for the existing research in corporate governance is the failure to control for endogeneity between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Although we argue that firm performance is influenced by 
corporate governance, it is very likely that firm adjust their governance according to the performance. For 
example, Bhagat and Black (2001) report evidence that low profitability firms increase the independence 
of their boards of directors. It is ideal but impractical if we treat both MGTOWN and bodind as 
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endogenous. Our empirical strategy treats MGTOWN as exogenous and bodind as endogenous so that it 
is feasible to cope with the interaction effect. It is reasonable that ownership structure would influence 
board composition, not the other way around. Although ownership structure is arguably influenced by 
performance (Demsetz, 1983), the check of the raw data using the heuristics suggested by Erickson et al. 
(2005) reveals that the ownership structure is quite stable in our sample period and does not vary with 
performance. Firm size and board size are used as instruments for board independence. The ideal 
instruments are correlated with board independence but not correlated with firm performance. Firm size is 
used as an instrument since large firms have high visibility and may have more board seats devoted to 
symbolic purposes (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Himmelberg, et al., 1999). We also use board size as an 
instrument since it has been suggested that it has important implications for decision-making and firm 
strategy (Dalton et al., 1998). A large board might be indicative of a broad line of business and may 
require more knowledge that can be brought into the board by outsiders (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). 
Firm size is measured as the logarithm of total assets (average of the total assets for the year). Board size 
(BODSIZE)  is the number of the directors including the Chair of the board. Because board independence 
is endogenous, it follows that the interaction of board independence and ownership concentration are also 
subject to an endogeneity problem. One solution would be to use the instrumental variables to get the 
predicted value of board independence, and then use this predicted variable to interact with the ownership 
concentration. However, this is so-called “forbidden regression” because the predicted value of an 
interaction term is not the same as the linear combination of the predicted value of individual terms 
(Wooldridge 2001, section 9, for a detailed discussion). The alternative is to also use the interaction of 
instruments with ownership concentration as instruments since they are not a linear combination of two 
sets of variables. Therefore, for purposes of parsimony, we include the interaction of board size and 
ownership concentration, as well as firm size and board size as instruments to control for the endogeneity 
of board independence. We use two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) to perform the analysis. Since “SEP” is a 
dichotomy variable, we employ the “switching regression” suggested by Shaver (1998) and Gulati, 
Lawrence and Puranam (2005) to control for the endogeneity when there is a strategic choice variable 
mediating the relationship between exogenous variables and outcome variables. However, we do not find 
any significant result for this board independence measurement. So we only report the model using 
“IND”. 
 
 
Agency theory predicts that β1 would be positive. The alignment hypothesis suggests that β2 is 
positive and the entrenchment hypothesis suggests β3 is negative. Our hypothesis suggests β4 should be 
negative. Moreover, we are interested in the overall effect of bodind. The coefficients in interaction 
models no longer indicate the average effect of a variable as they do in a linear-additive model. Now we 
are not directly interested in the significance or insignificance of the model parameters per se anyway and 
we need to interpret the marginal effect of each independent variable on the dependent variable (Brambor, 
Clark and Golder, 2005). As suggested before, we are concerned with the marginal effect of board 
independence on performance: MGTOWNbodindROA 41/ ββ +=∂∂ . And therefore we want to know the 
standard error of this quantity: )ˆˆcov(2)ˆvar()ˆvar(ˆ 414
2
1/ ββββσ MGTOWNMGTOWNbodindROA ++=∂∂ . It is perfectly 
possible for the marginal effect of board independence on performance to be significant for substantively 
relevant values of ownership even if the coefficients of individual and interaction terms are insignificant. 
Hypothesis1 predicts that 041 >×+ itMGTOWNββ  when managerial ownership can be used to align 
the interest of management with that of shareholders even though the positive effect of board 
independence is decreasing. Hypothesis2 predicts that 041 ≤×+ itMGTOWNββ  when ownership is 
highly concentrated in the hand of management so that managers get entrenched and do not have 
incentive to behave to the interest of shareholders. When this happens, board independence is mainly used 
for the symbolic purpose and may hinder firm performance.  
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Table 1 :  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable Observation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
ROA 440 0.07 0.075 -0.4 0.517
Leverage 440 0.268 0.162 0 1.609
Sales growth 440 0.118 0.242 -0.784 1.225
Liquidity 440 0.057 0.07 -0.003 0.53
Firm Size 440 3.51 0.491 2.136 4.811
Board Size 440 11.69 3.02 4 22
IND 440 0.742 0.149 0.27 0.93
SEP 440 0.693 0.462 0 1
INST 440 0.11 0.2 0 0.94
BLK 440 0.112 0.219 0 0.82
MGTOWN 440 0.145 0.273 0 0.95  
 
 
 
Table 2 :  Correlations between variables 
 
 
Variable ROA Leverage
Sales
growth
Liquidity SIZE BODSIZE IND SEP INST BLK
ROA 1
Leverage -0.072 1
Sales growth 0.326 -0.031 1
Liquidity -0.015 -0.198 -0.008 1
Firm Size -0.122 0.045 0.008 -0.108 1
Board Size -0.044 0.133 -0.03 -0.161 0.4314 1
IND -0.188 0.01 -0.132 -0.018 0.099 -0.037 1
SEP -0.072 0.182 -0.173 -0.18 0.032 0.152 0.245 1
INST -0.051 -0.072 -0.025 -0.087 -0.198 -0.015 -0.028 0.067 1
BLK 0.076 -0.007 -0.023 0.153 0.148 -0.122 -0.023 0.068 -0.203 1
MGTOWN 0.055 0.072 0.044 -0.052 0.116 0.288 -0.394 -0.228 -0.225 -0.25  
 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Table 1 and 2 provides the means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum and Pearson 
correlations coefficients between variables in the analysis. Data reveal several significant relationships. 
Managerial ownership is significantly and negatively related to the proportion of outside directors and a 
separation of CEO and Chair. This seems to conform to the substitution hypothesis that a higher 
alignment effect through managerial ownership reduces the need for outside directors and a separation of 
CEO and Chair. However, this also provides evidence that management tends to entrench itself by 
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controlling for the composition of the board. The negative correlation between ROA and IND is 
counterintuitive because board independence should increase firm profitability. ROA does not seem to 
have a significant relationship with other corporate governance mechanisms in the univariate analysis. 
However, because univariate analysis fails to capture interactions among variables, we now turn to the 
multivariate estimates. 
 
Regression Analysis 
 
We use pooled multiple observations over time for each firm to test the hypothesis. The panel 
data allow us to consider the idiosyncratic characteristic of each firm which is not possible in cross-
sectional data (Baltagi, 2001; Greene, 2003). Our theoretical argument suggests that governance 
mechanisms reflect the firm’s idiosyncratic environment and would systematically differ due to 
unobservable heterogeneity (Himmelberg, et al., 1999). We use a fixed effects specification, in which the 
effects of independent variables are the same for all firms but only the intercepts differ for each firm in 
the sample. In the models presented below, we include an F-test to check whether unobserved 
heterogeneity is significant. All our models show that it is. A fixed effects estimator has much to 
recommend it because it requires few assumptions (Baltagi, 2001); we also perform a Hausman test to 
determine whether a fixed-effect is preferred to that of a random effects specification. In all of our 
models, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that the explanatory variables are independent of the 
unobserved factors. Therefore, we use a fixed effect specification in all models with or without 
instruments. However, the fixed effects estimator is conditional on the sample because the individual 
effect of each firm is not assumed to have a distribution. Therefore, caution is required when making the 
out of sample generalization.  
 
 
Two concerns regarding the estimation are heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
Heteroskedasticity occurs because the variance in the error term of the model is not constant across 
panels. Since this problem usually arises due to group-wise differences, taking the group mean can solve 
it to some extent. Autocorrelation in the error terms occur for each firm over time when unobserved 
factors that vary greatly between firms but change slowly over time influence outcomes. Because our 
sample is composed of a broad cross section of firms with only five years of data, we assume we can 
capture this temporal effect by using fixed effects and year dummies.  
 
 
We first use a fixed effects specification without controlling for endogeneity to replicate previous 
studies that argue for the independent effects of single mechanisms. The results are shown in Table 3, 
model 1 to 3. We do not find a significant effect of board independence as measured by IND and SEP, 
which should be positive according to agency theory. Nor do we find significance in institutional investor 
ownership or block ownership; their signs are even negative. This adds more inconclusiveness in the 
results of prior studies (Dalton et al., 1998; 2003). One possible reason for the non-result of institutional 
investors is that they tend to be passive. Proxy statements seem to back this up since institutional 
investors generally supported management proposals. As for blockholders, one interpretation is that their 
substantial investment in a firm leads them to be risk averse in a way that may be detrimental to the 
interests of fully diversified shareholders. Another interpretation is that blockholders potentially benefit 
from expropriation activities from other shareholders especially when they are entrenched (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999; Mikkelson and Regassa, 1991). However, the specific effect of 
large non-management blockholders needs further examination. The only result that is consistent with the 
literature is the curvilinear effect of managerial ownership (inverse U-shaped). MGTOWN has a positive 
impact while the MGTOWN2 has a negative impact on firm profitability. Managerial ownership is 
beneficial when it is less than about 40% of the overall voting rights. But at higher levels, managers may 
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become entrenched allowing them to pursue their own private interests without being challenged by 
shareholders. Our result is a little bit higher than that found in McConnell and Servaes (1990).  
 
 
 
Table 3:    Fixed Effect Panel Data Model without/with Controlling For Endogeneity
2
 
 
 
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
0.041** 0.047 0.022 -0.788**
-0.02 -0.042 -0.043 -0.364
0.132** 0.123* 0.126* 0.201**
-0.065 -0.066 -0.066 -0.096
-0.019 -0.015 -0.024 0.023
-0.035 -0.034 -0.035 -0.052
0.089*** 0.096*** 0.090*** 0.098***
-0.013 -0.012 -0.013 -0.019
0.02 0.011 1.059**
-0.052 -0.051 -0.468
0.017 0.019
-0.013 -0.013
-0.017 -0.02 -0.02
-0.037 -0.038 -0.034
-0.026 -0.028 -0.059
-0.047 -0.047 -0.043
1.146*** 1.154*** 2.969***
-0.27 -0.27 -1.296
-1.392*** -1.389*** -1.707***
-0.351 -0.351 -0.532
-2.216
-1.452
F test of fixed effect 2.55*** 2.34*** 2.47*** 2.58***
F test of model 8.85*** 8.57*** 7.76***
Wald Chi-square 467.48***
Constant
Liquidity
Leverage
Sales growth
Independent Directors (IND)
CEO/Chair Separation (SEP)
Institution Ownership (INST)
Block Ownership (BLK)
Managerial ownership (MGTOWN)
Managerial ownership squared
(MGTOWN2)
IND*MGTOWN
 
 
 
We further examine the substitution effects and the symbolic effect by controlling for the 
endogeneity. Model 4 shows the results of 2SLS models using the instruments to account for the 
endogenous board independence. In the first stage, we run the board independence measures on the 
instrumental variables. We then inserted the predicted value for board independence measures into the 
second stage to get the corrected estimation. We use the proportion of independent directors (IND) as the 
measure of board independence. After controlling for endogeneity and the unobserved fixed effect, we 
find that if the proportion of independent directors increases by 10%, the firm’s ROA would increase by 
about 10.6% in the absence of a significant managerial ownership stake, which is a big difference. The 
result is also consistent with the agency theory. However, we also find that the interaction of IND and 
managerial ownership (MGTOWN) is negative. The coefficient for the interaction is -2.216 (p < 0.127), 
which is marginally significant. This indicates that the effect of board independence is contingent on the 
                                                 
2 year fixed effect is significant in the model but are not reported. Instrumental variables for model 4 are 
board size, firm size and the interaction between board size and managerial ownership. Standard errors 
are in the parentheses. Level of significance: * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
